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Subgraph Robustness of Complex
Networks under Attacks
Yilun Shang
AbstractNetwork measures derived from empirical observa-
tions are often poor estimators of the true structure of system as
it is impossible to observe all components and all interactions
in many real world complex systems. Here, we study attack
robustness of complex networks with data missing caused by
(i) a uniform random sampling and (ii) a non-uniform random
sampling. By introducing the subgraph robustness problem,
we develop analytically a framework to investigate robustness
properties of the two types of subgraphs under random attacks,
localized attacks, and targeted attacks. Interestingly, we nd
that the benchmark models such as Erdos-Re´nyi graphs, ran-
dom regular networks, and scale-free networks possess distinct
characteristic subgraph robustness features. We show that the
network robustness depends on several factors including network
topology, attack mode, sampling method and the amount of data
missing, generalizing some well-known robustness principles of
complex networks. Our results offer insight into the structural
effect of missing data in networks and highlight the signicance
of understanding different sampling processes and their conse-
quences on attack robustness, which may be instrumental in
designing robust systems.
Index TermsComplex networks, complex systems, sampling,
attack robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPLEX networks, such as social networks, the WorldWide Web, and gene regulatory networks, provide a com-
pact and powerful representation of the interaction structure
of a wide range of complex systems, where nodes represent
entities (e.g., people, web sites, genes) and edges represent
some type of connections (e.g., friendship, communication,
regulation) [1], [2]. To study the networks one needs to rst
collect reliable large scale network data. Even with the emer-
gence of the Internet, social media, and high-throughput gene
expression analysis, in most cases data collected for complex
networks are incomplete with nodes and edges missing. In
social network analysis, this is often due to the so-called
boundary effects or respondent inaccuracy in network surveys
[3][5]. For example, networks arising from the popular social
network platforms are not completely mapped because of the
boundary effects; namely, there are people who do not actually
use the social networking service except setting up an account
(so-called zombie accounts) and so we cannot observe their
connections. Anonymous purchase in online shopping sites
also induces a similar boundary effect. Likewise, respondents
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may be absent on the day of survey administration or have
opted-out of the survey for privacy reasons, leading to unob-
served nodes in the network. In other empirical studies, having
access to all the nodes may be virtually impossible due to huge
network size or limited resources. All these situations give rise
to a sampling of the network nodes, i.e., a partially observed
subgraph of the network [6], [7].
Networks with incomplete or missing data have been probed
mainly in two directions of research. Broadly speaking, one
line of work has focused on prediction/inference of missing
edges or nodes with a view to determine the full network
structure, which is a common requirement in many graph-
mining tasks, such as community detection, belief propagation,
and inuence maximization, etc. The edge oriented version
is commonly known as the link prediction problem [8][10],
which has various applications ranging from recommender
systems to computational biology; see the survey [11]. The
node oriented version, referred to as missing node identica-
tion problem, has been studied recently in [12][15]. Important
applications in the security community, for example, include
identication of missing person in a family tree or people
wanted by the police as suspects in a crime. A node-based
incident prediction approach is proposed in [16], which has
applications in industrial control systems. This problem is
signicantly more difcult than the link prediction problem
as neither the nodes nor their edges are known with certainty
[17].
On the other hand, a different vibrant line of work con-
cerning missing data deals with structural effects of missing
edges or nodes on varied measurable properties of networks,
such as degree distribution [18], [19], average degree, average
path length, assortativity, clustering coefcient [4], [20], cen-
trality [7], [21], community structure [22], and the number
of small xed subgraphs [23], to name just a few. These
works basically address the question what happens to network
measures when some edges or nodes are missing? based
upon Monte-Carlo simulations. Various sampling procedures,
such as uniform random sampling [4], [7], snowball sampling
[24], respondent driven sampling [3], [25], and random walks
[22], [23], have also been developed to generate the partially
observed subnetwork. For example, the work [18] warns that
randomly sampled subnetworks of scale-free networks no
longer show scale-free properties. In general, however, the
effect of induced bias and how does it correlate with different
network topologies or levels of missing data are often not fully
understood.
In this paper, we follow the second line of research and
focus on another important network property, namely, the
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network robustness against attacks [26][29]. As is known,
the function and stability of networks rely crucially on the
interconnections between nodes in which failed nodes will
disable others connecting through them to the network and
may destroy or cripple the entire network. The vast majority
of previous work on network robustness assumes a complete
network, namely, all nodes and edges in the network are
observed; see, e.g. [1], [26], [30][33]. Motivated by the
above consideration, the goal of this paper is to investigate
analytically and by simulations attack robustness on networks
with missing nodes and edges, which we refer to as the
subgraph robustness problem.
We mention that the question addressed here is related in
concept to some previous works on attack robustness with
incomplete information. The work [34] examines the optimal
attack strategy on scale-free networks, in which a xed portion
of nodes are unobserved. Similarly, efcient attack strategies
with missing edges are examined in [35] with the aid of
link prediction techniques. Attack robustness of networks with
uncertain or local knowledge has been investigated by some
researchers; see e.g. [36][38]. In these works, all edges and
nodes in the network are present, while only some information
(such as the node degree) is not fully/precisely known.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGIES
In studying the subgraph robustness problem, we formally
consider two types of sampling by sampling the nodes either
uniformly at random, leading to a uniform subgraph (US) or
in a non-uniform manner, leading to a non-uniform subgraph
(NS). Using percolation theory [1], we investigate the robust-
ness of US and NS under different attacks in terms of the
relative size of giant component and the critical percolation
threshold at which the giant component rst collapses. The
network attacks considered here include:
² Random attack (RA), where randomly chosen nodes are
removed from the network, meaning that each node in the
network is attacked with equal probability. RA describes
random errors, system decay, or attacks without prior
knowledge of the network architecture; see e.g. [1], [26],
[32], [33], [39].
² Localized attack (LA), where nodes surrounding a seed
node are removed layer by layer, causing aggregated
damage of adjacent components limited to a specic area.
LA can be caused by natural disasters such as earthquakes
and oods, as well as mass attacks including bomb blasts
and malware infection; see e.g. [40][43].
² Targeted attack (TA), where nodes with a higher degree
are more vulnerable, meaning that nodes are attacked
in decreasing order of their connectivity. TA captures
sabotage on the Internet and some malicious attacks
against transportation hubs, important power stations,
etc.; see e.g. [26], [32], [44], [45].
We apply our derived theoretical frameworks to three types
of network models including Erdos-Re´nyi (ER) networks
[46] with a Poisson degree distribution, random regular (RR)
networks following a degenerated degree distribution, and
scale-free (SF) networks [26], [47] characterized by a power-
law degree distribution. Formally, consider a random network
captured by an arbitrary degree distribution P (k), which is
the probability that a randomly chosen node has k neighbors.
The generating function of the degree distribution is dened
as G0(x) =
P1
k=0 P (k)x
k [1], [48]. Here, we are interested
in networks with missing data generated in the following two
types of sampling processes (see Fig. 1):
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of (a) US and (b) NS on square lattices. Solid
nodes and lines represent the observed subgraphs.
² Uniform random sampling, meaning that a fraction q of
nodes deployed uniformly at random in the network are
observed. This is a natural setting commonly used in
other work; see e.g. [4], [6], [19]. The induced subgraph
on the observed nodes is said to be the uniform subgraph
(US). Namely, US is constructed by removing a fraction
1 ¡ q of unobserved nodes as well as their contributing
edges;
² Non-uniform random sampling, where a fraction 1 ¡ q
of nodes sitting in some multi-hop neighborhood of a
random selected node cannot be observed. In other words,
the observed subgraph, referred to as the non-uniform
subgraph (NS), is obtained by removing a seed node, its
nearest neighbors, its second nearest neighbors and so
on until a fraction 1 ¡ q of nodes in the entire network
are removed. This situation reects networks suffering
from a single-source spreading data contamination [5],
[49] or a diffusive non-respondent bias in network surveys
[3], [21], which have been studied extensively in social
network analysis.
As we have mentioned, there are multiple ways in which
data missing can be biased. The non-uniform random sampling
considered here not only provides a comparison for the typical
random sampling but is amenable to analytical treatment for
all attack strategies we are interested in this paper. We assume
that attack is launched against the observed subgraph, i.e.,
US and NS, until a fraction 1 ¡ p of nodes in the subgraph
are attacked. A major characteristic of network functionality
is the relative size of the giant component, denoted by P1,
consisting of all remaining nodes that survive the attack. The
critical threshold at which the giant component rst collapses,
i.e. P1 » 0, is denoted by pc. Evidently, when q = 1, we are
reduced to the usual percolation settings where all nodes in
the network are observed [1]. We will focus on the effects of
network topologies (ER, RR, SF), attack strategies (RA, LA,
TA), amount of data missing (q), and sampling methods (US,
NS) on the two measures pc and P1.
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Obviously, irrespective of the network topology, a given
subnetwork is more vulnerable than the complete network
in the sense that a subnetwork always collapses prior to the
complete network. Hence, interpreting the attack robustness
results when only a subgraph is observed, as is often the case
in the real world, could make us, on one hand, over-optimistic
in the situations of benecial attacks such as the regulation
of cancer stem cells or containing pandemic diseases, while
on the other hand, over-pessimistic when the attacks are
malicious, e.g., sabotage on the Internet and damage on the
infrastructures. Interestingly, we nd that such illusion could
be signicant in some situations while negligible in others,
depending on the interplay between the network topology, the
attack mode, the sampling method, as well as the amount of
data missing. Our extensive simulations are in good agreement
with analytical calculations. Simulation results are based on
synthetic network models with N = 106 nodes and averages
over 100 realizations. In addition to the model networks, sim-
ulations on real-world networks, including social, technical,
biological and infrastructural ones are also performed.
It is worth noting that, in addition to pc and P1 considered
here, there have been a number of other robustness metrics
reported in the literature, but mostly based upon these two
measures as well as shortest path lengths in the networks; see
e.g. [27], [50], [51]. As such, these measures are computation-
ally more involved and not analytically tractable in general.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON SUBGRAPH
ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we perform the analytical study on subgraph
robustness under three types of attacks, RA, LA, and TA,
respectively. We mention that the equations derived below for
nding robustness in RA, LA, and TA have more or less been
studied in previous works, particularly, [32], [40], [44], in
the case of fully observed networks (i.e., q = 1). We show
below how these techniques can be adapted in networks with
any amount of data missing to paint a larger picture in the
framework of subgraph robustness. The results reveal non-
trivial phenomena which have not been observed in an entire
network with given degree distribution (see Section IV for
details).
A. Subgraph robustness under RA
We begin with the robustness of US under RA. In a random
attack, each node of US is occupied, i.e., remains intact, with
probability p. Therefore, RA launched on US is equivalent
to the classical node percolation on the entire network with
occupation probability pq [1]. Recall that the generating func-
tion of the degree distribution is G0(x) =
P1
k=0 P (k)x
k.
The generating function H1(x) of the size distribution of the
clusters that can be reached following a randomly chosen
edge satises a self-consistency equation H1(x) = 1 ¡
pq + pqxG1(H1(x)), where G1(x) = G00(x)=G
0
0(1) [32].
Likewise, the generating function for the size of the cluster
to which a randomly chosen node belongs is generated by
H0(x) = 1 ¡ pq + pqxG0(H1(x)). Therefore, the mean size
of small clusters is
H 00(1) = pq
·
1 +
pqG00(1)
1¡ pqG01(1)
¸
; (1)
which diverges when 1 = pqG01(1) marking the critical value
pc at which the giant component collapses. Noting that q >
1=G01(1) guarantees the existence of a giant component in US,
we have
pc(RA) = min
½
1;
1
qG01(1)
¾
: (2)
The fraction of the giant component in the original network,
denoted by S(RA), is given by
S(RA) = 1¡H0(1) = pq[1¡G0(u)]; (3)
where u = H1(1) satises u = 1¡ pq + pqG1(u). We dene
P1 as the relative size of the giant component as a fraction of
the entire network. By denition, we have P1(RA) = S(RA).
Clearly, when all nodes are observable, i.e., q = 1, Eqs. (2)
and (3) reduce to the usual site percolation framework [32].
Next, we turn to the robustness of NS under RA. A key
observation here is that the non-uniform sampling can be
described by the so-called localized attack procedure, where
nodes are attacked shell by shell from a random root node until
a certain fraction of nodes are removed [40], [52]. Following
[40], the generating function of the degree distribution of NS
becomes
G^0(x) =
1
G0(f)
G0
µ
f +
G00(f)
G00(1)
(x¡ 1)
¶
; (4)
where f = G¡10 (q). Let G^1(x) = G^
0
0(x)=G^
0
0(1). By dening
the two generating functions H^0(x) and H^1(x) for the size
distributions of the clusters similarly, and following the above
site percolation procedure with occupation probability p, we
are led to the critical equation which determines the break-up
point of the giant component 1 = pG^01(1). Hence, by using
(4) we obtain
pc(RA) = min
½
1;
G00(1)
G000(f)
¾
; (5)
where again f = G¡10 (q). Note that when G^
0
1(1) = 1, namely,
q satises G00(1) = G
00
0(f), we have pc = 1, which is precisely
the time when a giant component rst forms in NS [40].
The fraction of the giant component in NS, denoted by
S(RA), is given by
S(RA) = 1¡ H^0(1) = p[1¡ G^0(u)]; (6)
where u = H^1(1) satises u = 1¡p+pG^1(u). By denition,
we have P1(RA) = qS(RA). Note that when q = 1, i.e., all
nodes are observed, we readily reproduce the framework in
[40] since G^0(x) = G0(x).
B. Subgraph robustness under LA
In this section, we investigate another popular type of attack,
LA, which is rst introduced in [40] and further developed by
some other researchers; see e.g., [41][43].
First, we consider the robustness of US under LA. US is
a random subgraph obtained by occupying each node with
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probability q in the original network. Following the method
introduced in [32], [44], we nd the generating function for
the degree distribution of US to be
~G0(x) =
1X
k=0
P (k)(1¡ q + qx)k: (7)
We then perform LA on US until a fraction 1¡p of the nodes
are removed. The generating function of the degree distribution
of the remaining nodes in US can be derived as [40]
~G0;p(x) =
1
~G0(g)
~G0
Ã
g +
~G00(g)
~G00(1)
(x¡ 1)
!
; (8)
where g = ~G¡10 (p). Let ~G1;p(x) = ~G
0
0;p(x)= ~G
0
0;p(1). By
combining (7), (8) and the criterion for the network to collapse,
~G01;p(1) = 1 [1], [32], we nd that
pc(LA) = minf1; ~pcg; (9)
where ~pc satises ~G000( ~G
¡1
0 (p)) = ~G
0
0(1). Note that when q =
1=G01(1), we have ~G
00
0(1) = ~G
0
0(1) and hence ~pc = 1, which
is precisely the time when a giant component rst forms in
US.
The fraction of the giant component in US can be expressed
by
S(LA) = 1¡ ~G0;p(u); (10)
where u = ~G1;p(u) [48]. By denition, we have P1(LA) =
pqS(LA). Clearly, when q = 1, we reproduce the framework
in [40] since ~G0(x) = G0(x) by (7).
Next, we study the robustness of NS under LA. The degree
distribution of NS is generated by (4). We now perform LA
on NS until a fraction 1¡ p of the nodes are removed. As in
the above case of US, the generating function of the degree
distribution of the remaining nodes in NS is shown to be given
by
G^0;p(x) =
1
G^0(h)
G^0
Ã
h+
G^00(h)
G^00(1)
(x¡ 1)
!
; (11)
where h = G^¡10 (p). Dene G^1;p(x) = G^
0
0;p(x)=G^
0
0;p(1).
Combining (4), (11) and the criterion for the network to
collapse, G^01;p(1) = 1 [32], we nd that
pc(LA) = minf1; p^cg; (12)
where p^c satises G^000(G^
¡1
0 (p)) = G^
0
0(1). Note that when
G^01(1) = 1, namely, q satises G
0
0(1) = G
00
0(G
¡1
0 (q)), we
have G^000(h) = G^
0
0(1) = G^
00
0(1) and hence p^c = 1, which is
precisely the time when a giant component rst forms in NS.
The fraction of the giant component in NS is given by
S(LA) = 1¡ G^0;p(u); (13)
where u = G^1;p(u). By denition, we have P1(LA) =
pqS(LA). Noting that G^0(x) = G0(x) by (4) when q = 1, we
again reproduce the usual LA attacks on the entire network.
C. Subgraph robustness under TA
In a targeted attack, a fraction 1¡ p of nodes are attacked
and removed according to their degrees. Following [37], [44],
we assign to each node in the observed subgraph a value
W®(ki) =
k®iPN
i=1 k
®
i
; (14)
to indicate the probability that a node i with degree ki is
attacked, where ® is a real and N is the number of nodes in
the subnetwork in question. When ® > 0, nodes with higher
degree have a higher probability to be removed; pushing it
to the limit ® ! 1 yields the attack strategy that nodes are
removed strictly in the decreasing order of connectivity. The
case ® < 0 implies the opposite strategies. Note that TA with
® = 0 is equivalent to RA with equal probability. In fact, we
have pc(TA) = pc(RA) and P1(TA) = P1(RA) for both
US and NS when ® = 0; see below and Appendix A for a
proof.
Fix a value of ®. We begin with the robustness of US under
TA. The generating function for the degree distribution of US,
denoted by ~P (k), is given by (7). In other words, we have
~G0(x) =
P1
k=0
~P (k)xk =
P1
k=0 P (k)(1¡ q + qx)k In fact,
~P (k) can be explicitly calculated as ~P (k) = 1k!
dk ~G0(x)
(dx)k
¯¯
x=0
=
qk
P1
l=k P (l)P
k
l (1 ¡ q)l¡k for k ¸ 0. Following [44], [52],
[53], we dene ~G®(x) =
P1
k=0
~P (k)xk
®
and t = ~G¡1® (p),
and the degree distribution of the remaining nodes in US after
TA (but keeping the edges connecting to those removed nodes)
is generated by ~Gt(x) = p¡1
P1
k=0
~P (k)tk
®
xk. Performing
another bond percolation by using the same approach as in
[1], [44], we obtain the generating function of the remaining
network as
~G0;t(x) = ~Gt(1¡ pt + ptx); (15)
where pt =
hP1
k=0
~P (k)ktk
®
i.hP1
k=0
~P (k)k
i
. Dene
~G1;t(x) = ~G00;t(x)= ~G
0
0;t(1). Combining (7), (15) and the
criterion for the network to collapse, ~G01;t(1) = 1, we nd
that
pc(TA) = minf1; pc;tg; (16)
where pc;t satises t = ~G¡1® (p) and
P1
k=0
~P (k)k =P1
k=0
~P (k)tk
®
k(k¡1). Note that when q = 1=G01(1), we have
~G000(1) = ~G
0
0(1) and hence pc;t = t = 1, which is precisely
the time when a giant component rst forms in US.
The fraction of the giant component in US can be expressed
by
S(TA) = 1¡ ~G0;t(u); (17)
where u = ~G1;t(u). By denition, we have P1(TA) =
pqS(TA). Clearly, when q = 1, we reproduce the usual
targeted attack framework in [44], [48] since ~G0(x) = G0(x).
Finally, we consider the robustness of NS under TA.
The generating function for the degree distribution of
NS, denoted by P^ (k), is given by (4). Therefore, P^ (k)
can be explicitly calculated as P^ (k) = 1k!
dkG^0(x)
(dx)k
¯¯
x=0
=
[k!G0(f)]¡1G
(k)
0 (f ¡G00(f)=G00(1)) [G00(f)=G00(1)]k for
k ¸ 0. Similarly, following [44], [52], [53], we dene
G^®(x) =
P1
k=0 P^ (k)x
k® and s = G^¡1® (p), and the degree
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Fig. 2. (a) Percolation threshold pc as a function of relative subgraph size q for ER networks with size N = 106 and ¸ = 5. Corresponding fraction of
giant component P1 as a function of p is presented for (b) q = 0:8 and (c) q = 1. Theoretical predictions (solid lines) and simulations (symbols) for US
and NS, and for RA, LA, and TA (with ® = 1), respectively, agree well with each other, where averages are taken over 100 realizations.
distribution of the remaining nodes in NS after TA (but
keeping the edges connecting to those removed nodes) is
generated by G^s(x) = p¡1
P1
k=0 P^ (k)s
k®xk. Performing a
bond percolation by using the same approach as in [1], [44],
we obtain the generating function of the remaining network
as
G^0;s(x) = G^s(1¡ ps + psx); (18)
ps =
hP1
k=0 P^ (k)ks
k®
i.hP1
k=0 P^ (k)k
i
. Dene G^1;s(x) =
G^00;s(x)=G^
0
0;s(1). Combining (4), (18) and the criterion for the
network to collapse, G^01;s(1) = 1, we nd that
pc(TA) = minf1; pc;sg; (19)
where pc;s satises s = G^¡1® (p) and
P1
k=0 P^ (k)k =P1
k=0 P^ (k)s
k®k(k ¡ 1). Note that when G^01(1) = 1, namely,
q satises G00(1) = G
00
0(G
¡1
0 (q)), we have G^
00
0(1) = G^
0
0(1)
and hence pc;s = s = 1, which is precisely the time when a
giant component rst forms in NS.
Similarly, the fraction of the giant component in NS is given
by
S(TA) = 1¡ G^0;s(u); (20)
where u = G^1;s(u). By denition, we have P1(TA) =
pqS(TA). When q = 1, we again reproduce the usual targeted
attack framework because f = 1 and G^0(x) = G0(x).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we calculate numerical solutions of the
analytical expressions and compare our theoretical results with
simulations on three types of complex network benchmarks
including ER, RR, and SF networks. An ER network follows
a Poisson degree distribution P (k) = e¡¸¸k=k! (k ¸ 0) with
average degree hki = ¸. An RR network has a degenerated
degree distribution P (k) = ±k;k0 , meaning that each node
is connected to the same number k0 of neighbors. A SF
network follows a power-law degree distribution P (k) » k¡°
(kmin · k · kmax), where ° > 0 is the scaling exponent,
kmin and kmax indicate the minimum and maximum degrees,
respectively. All the simulation results are obtained for net-
works with N = 106 nodes. We also instantiate the general
formula obtained in Section 3 in the special cases of ER
and RR networks in Appendices B and C, respectively, for
reference.
A. ER networks
The subgraph robustness results gathered in Fig. 2 for ER
network allow us to draw several interesting comments. First,
an increase in the relative subgraph size q systematically yields
an decrease in pc as well as an increase in P1 for both US
and NS, and for all attack strategies. This means that the
larger the observed subgraph is, the longer it takes to break
it, as one would expect. Furthermore, the bias of pc caused
by the data missing is not linearly correlated with q. When
q is small, e.g., q 2 [0:2; 0:4], pc changes dramatically, while
pc(q) is relatively close to pc(1) for q > 0:8. This suggests
that ER networks have a tolerance for mild data missing (esp.
under RA and LA), lending support to the qualitatively similar
observations for other topological properties [7], [19], [20].
Second, as predicted in Appendix B, we have pUSc (RA) =
pNSc (RA) = p
US
c (LA) = p
NS
c (LA) and P
US
1 (RA) =
PNS1 (RA) = P
US
1 (LA) = P
NS
1 (LA) for all p and q. This
is an extension of the phenomenon discovered originally in
[40] that the two competitive factors behind LA, namely, the
factor due to heterogeneity that hubs are more likely within
the attacked area accelerating the network fragmentation and
the factor due to localization that only nodes on the surface
of the attacked area contribute to the breakdown mitigating
the fragmentation process, compensate exactly for each other
in ER networks. Our theoretical calculations (see Appendix
B) indicate that both US and NS possess the same thinned
Poisson degree distribution (namely, with smaller event rate),
which explains the equivalent effect of RA and LA on them. In
other words, the uniform sampling and non-uniform sampling
considered here for ER networks are essentially equivalent.
Third, among the three types of attacks, TA is always the
most powerful for both US and NS, as well as all p and
q. Moreover, the observed equivalence, namely, pUSc (TA) =
pNSc (TA) and P
US
1 (TA) = P
NS
1 (TA), holds for all ®, which
is again due to the second point mentioned above. Fourth,
from Fig. 2(b) and (c) we observe second-order percolation
transition behaviors as expected. The critical threshold at
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Fig. 3. (a) Percolation threshold pc as a function of relative subgraph size q for RR networks with size N = 106 and k0 = 5. Two points of intersection are
indicated by A and B. Corresponding fraction of giant component P1 as a function of p is presented for (b) q = 0:8 and (c) q = 1. Theoretical predictions
(solid lines) and simulations (symbols) for US and NS, and for RA, LA, and TA (with ® = 1), respectively, agree well with each other, where averages are
taken over 100 realizations.
P1 = 0 coincides with the critical probability pc in Fig. 2(a)
for all attack strategies and all q considered. For instance, both
Fig. 2(a) and (b) indicate pc ¼ 0:4 for TA (with ® = 1) when
q = 0:8, i.e., 80% of the nodes are observed.
B. RR networks
In Fig. 3 we show the subgraph robustness for RR networks
under various attack schemes. The behaviors observed deviate
largely from those in ER networks. First, we have pUSc ¸ pNSc
for any relative subgraph size q and attack strategies con-
sidered, where the equality is attained at q = 1 (see Fig.
3(a)). This means that US of RR networks is more vulnerable
against attacks than NS of the same size. Note that one of
the fundamental observations in [40], [43], putting it in our
language, that the giant component in NS of RR networks is
larger than that in US of RR networks does not imply our
result since pc is not linearly correlated with P1.
Second, for both US and NS, TA is the most powerful
one among these attacks as one would expect. Moreover, we
observe pUSc (RA) ¸ pUSc (LA) and pNSc (RA) ¸ pNSc (LA),
and the analogous inequalities for PUS1 and P
NS
1 hold for
all p, meaning that RA is always more powerful than LA.
(The rigorous quantitative relationship between them can be
found in Appendix C.) When q = 1, i.e., the entire RR
network is observed, this phenomenon can be attributed to
the disappearance of heterogeneity factor behind LA, with
only the localization factor mitigating the fragmentation of
the network leading to the lower efciency of LA [40]. Our
nding highlights that US and NS for any q · 1 are still quite
homogeneous to the extent that localization factor becomes
dominant and the subnetwork in question becomes more robust
against LA than against RA.
Third, we nd interestingly from Fig. 3(a) two crossover
points, namely, A of pUSc (LA) and p
NS
c (RA), and B of
pUSc (LA) and p
NS
c (TA). It is easy to verify that such crossover
points exist for all RR networks with k0 > 2 by our theoretical
derivation in Appendix C. The existence of these crossover
points indicates that, although RR networks are more resilient
against LA than against RA for a given type of subgraph
sampling, US under LA can be more fragile than NS under
RA when q < Aq, where Aq represents the value of q
corresponding to the point A. Similar results hold when
comparing LA and TA (with any given ®). These phenomena
highlight that LA is not always the least harmful strategy for
RR networks when subgraph robustness is taken into account,
in sharp contrast to the robustness behavior of the entire
network [40], [43].
Fourth, comparing Fig. 3(b), (c) and Fig. 3(a), we see
that the critical threshold at P1 = 0 again coincides with
the critical probability pc for all attack strategies and all
q considered. The behaviors of P1 and pc are generally
consistent with each other. As in ER networks, pc(q) (and
P1(p) at q, resp.) is quite close to pc(1) (and P1(p) at q = 1,
resp.) when q is large, say, q ¸ 0:8. This implies that that RR
networks also have a tolerance for mild data missing.
C. SF networks
We show in Fig. 4 the subgraph robustness for SF networks
with an archetypal scaling exponent ° = 2:36 under various
attack schemes. The behaviors observed differ markedly from
those for homogeneous ones such as ER and RR networks.
First, we observe that pUSc · pNSc for any relative subgraph
size q and attack strategies considered (see Fig. 4(a)), where
the equality is attained at q = 1 implying that US of SF
networks is more resilient against attack than NS of the same
size. Similarly as commented above, this goes beyond the
basic observation in [40], [43] that the giant component in
US of SF networks is larger than that in NS of SF networks.
It is worth mentioning that the difference between the two
curves pNSc and p
US
c hinges on the degree of heterogeneity
of the underlying network. For instance, when the network in
question becomes more homogeneous, i.e., when it possesses
a larger °, the inequality may reverse (the corresponding
percolation thresholds will look like Fig. 3(a) for an RR
network). We veried this by simulations for SF networks
with ° = 5. Similar crossover phenomena for SF networks
have been reported recently in [40], [42], [43] due to the
competition of the two factors behind LA.
Second, TA is again the most powerful one among these
three types of attack for both US and NS. However, in contrast
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Fig. 4. (a) Percolation threshold pc as a function of relative subgraph size q for SF networks with size N = 106, ° = 2:36, kmin = 2, and hki = 5. Three
points of intersection are indicated by A, B and C. Corresponding fraction of giant component P1 as a function of p is presented for (b) q = 0:8 and (c)
q = 1. Theoretical predictions (solid lines) and simulations (symbols) for US and NS, and for RA, LA, and TA (with ® = 1), respectively, agree well with
each other, where averages are taken over 100 realizations.
to ER and RR networks, we see that pUSc (LA) ¸ pUSc (RA)
and pNSc (LA) ¸ pNSc (RA), and the analogous inequalities
for PUS1 and P
NS
1 hold for all p, suggesting that LA is
always more powerful than RA. In the special case of q = 1,
this phenomenon is rst reported in [40], attributing to the
dominance of heterogeneity factor of LA, which accelerates
the breakdown of the network under LA. Our nding reveals
that US and NS for any q · 1 are still heterogenous to
the extent that heterogeneity factor remains dominant. This
phenomenon, nevertheless, again relies on the heterogeneity
of the SF network in question; namely, for SF networks with
large °, the robustness behaviors will more or less like those
for RR networks. This is conrmed by simulations for SF
networks with ° = 5.
Third, Fig. 4(a) displays three crossover points, i.e., A of
pUSc (LA) and p
NS
c (RA), B of p
US
c (TA) and p
NS
c (RA), and
C of pUSc (TA) and p
NS
c (LA). It is easy to verify numerically
that such crossover points exist for SF networks with relatively
small °, namely, for typical heterogenous SF networks. The
existence of these crossover points suggests that, although a
typical SF network is more resilient against RA than against
LA or TA for a given type of subgraph sampling, NS under
RA can be more vulnerable than US under LA when q < Aq,
and resp., US under TA when q < Bq, where Aq and Bq
are dened as before. This means that RA is not always
the least harmful strategy for a typical SF network when
subgraph robustness is taken into account, Furthermore, TA
is not always the most powerful attack either when it comes
to different subgraph robustness. For example, NS under LA
is more fragile than US under TA (with ® = 1) when q < Cq.
These phenomena highlight the importance of understanding
subgraph robustness in predicting network robustness as well
as designing resilient infrastructures.
Fourth, comparing Fig. 4(b), (c) and Fig. 4(a), we observe
that the critical threshold at P1 = 0 coincides with the critical
probability pc for all attack strategies and all q considered.
Similarly as in ER and RR networks, the behaviors of P1
and pc are generally consistent with each other.
Finally, distinct from ER and RR networks, we notice that
the curve pNSc (RA) (as well as P
NS
1 (RA) at q) changes much
more prominently as compared to the other ve curves for
relatively large values of q, e.g., q ¸ 0:8 (see Fig. 4(a)).
This can be intuitively explained as follows. When q decreases
gradually starting from 1 in the non-uniform way, the observed
subnetwork (NS) undergoes a change by missing possibly
a handful of hubs but in a localized way. The subgraph
robustness for LA and TA is not very sensitive to q because
the attacked nodes under these two strategies can be far away
from the missing nodes. However, for RA, the attacked nodes
are likely to escalate the damage caused by the missing nodes,
producing an evident change of the subgraph robustness with
respect to q. On the other hand, as one would expect, pUSc is
not sensitive for large q since the missing nodes are mostly
small degree nodes having limited contribution to the network
robustness. Our result indicates that a typical SF network
may have very poor error tolerance for mild data missing in
the non-uniform way while at the same time hold relatively
strong tolerance for mild data missing in the uniform way,
complementing the celebrated robustness characteristics of SF
networks, namely, they are resilient against random error but
fragile to targeted attack [26].
D. A closer look at US and NS with data missing
The quantitative difference between uniform and non-
uniform random sampling for different network topologies
and attack strategies can be better fathomed using the ratio
pUSc =p
NS
c in Fig. 5 and the discrepancy P
NS
1 ¡ PUS1 in Fig.
6. Marked signatures of ER, RR, and SF networks can be
observed. First of all, US and NS of ER networks have
precisely the same robustness in terms of pc and P1 under
all kinds of attack strategies as discussed above.
For RR networks, NS turns out to be always more robust
than US with the peak of the ratio pUSc =p
NS
c attained at
q = (k0 ¡ 1)¡1 = 0:25 (c.f. Fig. 3(a)). The peak of the ratio
for LA is over 2.5, which is more prominent than those for
RA and TA. However, with relatively mild data missing, say,
q ¸ 0:6, the ratio for RA, LA, and TA are similar. Therefore,
if we have a subnetwork of an RR network without knowing
the sampling process, we may perform LA on it and establish
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Bayesian statistical tests to determine whether uniform or non-
uniform sampling is closer to the truth. It follows from Fig.
6 that all the three attacks are of similar efcacy on RR
networks when PNS1 ¡ PUS1 is taken into consideration. They
are good estimators for differentiating between uniform and
non-uniform random samplings again around q = (k0 ¡ 1)¡1
(where the peaks appear in Fig. 6) with a shift towards the
larger q as the attack goes on. It is also noteworthy that, in
the event of mild data missing, e.g., q ¸ 0:7, the difference
between PNS1 and P
US
1 appears negligible when the loss of
the nodes is minor, e.g., does not exceed 20% (c.f. Fig.3 (b),
(c)).
For SF networks, US is always more robust than NS as we
have explained above. The ratios pUSc =p
NS
c for LA and TA are
very similar with a negative peak at q ¼ 0:45 corresponding
to the critical value at which the giant component of NS
collapses (c.f. Fig. 4(a)). Strikingly, the ratio for RA behaves
rather differently: it has a at and deep bottom in the interval
(approximately) q 2 [0:2; 0:8] and increases rapidly when
q approaches 1. Due to the displayed remarkable difference
between pUSc and p
NS
c , RA can be exploited to effectively
distinguish between US and NS for both mild and severe
data missing scenarios in SF networks. We observe from Fig.
6 that the discrepancy PNS1 ¡ PUS1 displays similar patterns
for all three attacks on SF networks; namely, a negative peak
appears at q ¼ 0:45 with a shift towards the larger q as the
attack continues. In contrast to RR networks, we nd that
PNS1 ¡PUS1 for SF networks is the most sensitive to TA while
the least sensitive to RA among the three attacks considered.
This sheds light on the essential difculty in dealing with TA
on SF networks, which perhaps is the most common real-life
attack situation [26]; namely, the robustness of SF networks
under TA distinctively associates to varied factors, including
the amount of data missing, the sampling methods, and the
different stages of attack.
The key contributions of this work are summarized in Table
I below.
V. APPLICATIONS ON REAL NETWORKS
The study of subgraph robustness is important for un-
derstanding appropriately the resilience of many real-world
networks since data missing is prevalent in such systems.
To illustrate the availability of our framework, we investigate
four real-world networks: (i) a friendship network based on
Brightkite social network (Friend) on N = 56739 nodes,
where nodes represent users and edges indicate the friendship
between them [54]; (ii) a road network of Pennsylvania (Road)
on N = 1087562 nodes, where nodes represent intersections
between roads and edges mean road segments [55]; (iii) a
metabolic network of the Reactome project (Metabolism) on
N = 5973 nodes, where nodes are proteins and edges are
interactions between them [56]; (iv) a computer network of
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TABLE I
SUBGRAPH ROBUSTNESS CHARACTERIZATION OF NETWORKS UNDER ATTACKS .
Main ndings
ER networks
1. US and NS are equivalent;
2. Both US and NS have good tolerance for mild data
missing under all attack strategies;
3. No crossover phenomenon occurs between US and NS;
1. Attack robustness increases
with the relative subgraph size
for both US and NS;
2. TA is the most harmful
attack strategy for both US
and NS;
3. P1 shows second-order
phase transition for both US
and NS under all attack
strategies;
RR networks
1. US is more vulnerable against attacks than NS of the
same size under all attack strategies;
(The difference is maximized in general under LA);
2. RA is more harmful than LA for both US and NS;
3. Both US and NS have good tolerance for mild data
missing under all attack strategies;
4. Two crossover points exist between US and NS
with respect to relative subgraph size;
SF networks
1. US is more resilient against attacks than NS of the
same size under all attack strategies;
(The difference is maximized in general under RA);
2. LA is more harmful than RA for both US and NS;
3. NS has very poor tolerance for mild data missing under
RA, while US and NS have good tolerance for mild data
missing under other attack strategies;
4. Three crossover points exist between US and NS
with respect to relative subgraph size;
the Skitter project (Computer) on N = 1694616 nodes, where
nodes are autonomous system on the Internet and edges are
connections [57].
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LA, TA (with ® = 1), and TB. For each q, the result is averaged over 100
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In addition to RA, LA, TA, we here study the effect on
network robustness of targeted removal of nodes according to
betweenness centrality (TB for short). The betweenness cen-
trality of a node is dened as the number of geodesic paths that
pass through this node [1]. Different from degree centrality,
betweenness centrality accounts for non-local structure of the
network, where nodes with high betweenness centrality play
a key role in governing the information ow.
We simulate the ratio pUSc =p
NS
c for the four types of attack
strategies on these networks with mild data missing, i.e.,
q 2 [0:8; 1]. The results are gathered in Fig. 7. Apparently,
Friend, Metabolism, and Computer networks show the sig-
nature of SF networks; the curve for RA is much steeper
than those for LA and TA when q approaches 1. This agrees
with our theory since the empirical statistics obtained in [54],
[56], [57] show power-law degree distributions for all these
three networks with scaling exponents ° ¼ 2:5; 1:7, and 2:3,
respectively. On the other hand, note that Road network is a
highly regular one with maximum degree 9 [55]. The curves in
Fig. 7(b) decreases gradually with respect to q. It is interesting
to observe that the ratio under LA begins to surpass that under
TA when q is getting smaller than, say, 0:85, which is in line
with our above derived result for RR.
One somewhat unexpected result is that targeting nodes
according to either degree (TA) or betweenness (TB) has much
the same effect. We contend that the similarity in effect may
nd its origins in the lack of specic structural properties that
would favor betweenness centrality to be superior robustness
indicators than degree, as is observed in [57] for Computer
network. For example, although the networks considered
here have power-law or exponential degree distributions with
changing q, they are essentially random by nature and are lack
of low degree nodes acting as bridges connecting highly
connected parts of the networks. The correlation between TA
and TB has also been discussed and compared numerically in
[31], [58] in terms of giant component size and diameter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Complex networks underlying a variety of technical, bio-
logical, social, and physical systems are confronted with data
missing constantly. In this paper, we introduce the subgraph
robustness problem created from the uniform random sampling
as well as the non-uniform random sampling. We develop a
theoretical framework to investigate robustness properties of
the two types of subnetworks under random attacks, localized
attacks, and targeted attacks. We show that ER, RR, and SF
networks have their own characteristic subgraph robustness
features, which are distinct from the robustness of the entire
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networks. Our results underscore the importance of under-
standing the different sampling processes and their conse-
quences on attack robustness of various network structures
(see Table I in Section IV).
In the present study, we have shown that the evaluation
of the impact of failures on the network connectivity can be
biased by the lack of information based on a priori knowledge
of the degree distribution. Nevertheless, in most practical
cases, it is unfeasible to estimate the network properties in
advance as a means of supporting the robustness to failure
analysis. Techniques tailored for specic applications, such as
immunization and communication systems, are to be proposed
to deal with the lack of information despite the network
topology properties. On the other hand, the importance of
looking at the entire history of the disintegration process to
understand the network robustness is argued in [51]. How
data missing inuences the structural robustness in this context
is to be understood. The present work may provide a useful
theoretical reference for these future quest and exploitation.
It is hoped that our results will stimulate further research
efforts on the subgraph robustness problem and other related
interesting and challenging questions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR EQUIVALENCE OF RA AND TA WHEN ® = 0
Let ® = 0 in (14). We rst prove the equivalence of
RA and TA in US. It follows from (7) and
P1
k=0
~P (k)k =P1
k=0
~P (k)tk(k ¡ 1) (see the equation below Eq.(16)) that
t =
P1
k=0
~P (k)kP1
k=0
~P (k)k(k ¡ 1) =
~G00(1)
~G000(1)
=
G00(1)
qG000(1)
: (21)
Noting that ~G®=0(x) = x, we have pc;t = t = 1=[qG01(1)]
and pc(TA) = pc(RA) by (16) and (2). Now, we turn to
the relative size of the giant component. Note that t = p.
It then follows from (15) that ~G0;t(x) = ~G0(1 ¡ t + tx) =P1
k=0 P (k)(1¡ pq + pqx)k. Therefore, (17) reduces to(
P1(TA) = pq

1¡P1k=0 P (k)(1¡ pq + pqv)k ;
v = ~G1;t(u) =
P1
k=0(1¡pq+pqv)k¡1P1
k=0 kP (k)
:
(22)
It is easy to see that P1(TA) = P1(RA) by comparing (22)
and (3) and employing the transformation u = 1¡ pq + pqv.
Next, we prove the equivalence of RA and TA in NS. It
follows from (4) and
P1
k=0 P^ (k)k =
P1
k=0 P^ (k)sk(k ¡ 1)
(see the equation below Eq.(19)) that
s =
P1
k=0 P^ (k)kP1
k=0 P^ (k)k(k ¡ 1)
=
G^00(1)
G^000(1)
=
1
G^01(1)
: (23)
Noting that G^®=0(x) = x, we have pc;s = s = 1=G^01(1) and
hence pc(TA) = pc(RA) by (19) and (5). Note that s = p.
Using (4) and (18), we observe that (20) can be recast as8>>>><>>>>:
P1(TA) = pq[1¡ G^s(1¡ p+ pv)]
= pq
h
1¡P1k=0 P^ (k)(1¡ p+ pv)ki ;
v = G^1;s(v) =
G^00;s(v)
G^00;s(1)
= G^
0
0(1¡p+pv)
G^00(1)
= G^1(1¡ p+ pv):
(24)
It is then direct to verify that P1(TA) = P1(RA) by compar-
ing (24) and (6) and applying the transformation u = 1¡p+pv.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION FOR SUBGRAPH ROBUSTNESS OF ER
NETWORKS
Recall that an ER network follows a Poisson degree distribu-
tion P (k) = e¡¸¸k=k! for k ¸ 0. Hence, G0(x) = G1(x) =
e¸(x¡1). By directed calculations based on the theoretical
framework developed in Section 2, we derive the following.
For US under RA, we have pUSc (RA) = minf1; (¸q)¡1g.
(Here, and in what follows, we will often use the superscripts
US and NS to avoid ambiguity.) PUS1 (RA) = pq[1¡e¸(u¡1)],
where u = 1¡ pq + pqe¸(u¡1). Note that G^0(x) = G^1(x) =
e¸q(x¡1). Hence, for NS under RA, we have pNSc (RA) =
minf1; (¸q)¡1g and PNS1 (RA) = pq[1 ¡ e¸q(u¡1)], where
u = 1¡ p+ pe¸q(u¡1).
For US under LA, we obtain pUSc (LA) = minf1; (¸q)¡1g
and PUS1 (LA) = pq[1 ¡ e¸pq(u¡1)], where u = e¸pq(u¡1)
by noting that ~G0(x) = e¸q(x¡1) and ~G0;p(x) = ~G1;p(x) =
e¸pq(x¡1). Similarly, we have G^0;p(x) = G^1;p(x) =
e¸pq(x¡1). Therefore, for NS under LA, we have pNSc (LA) =
minf1; (¸q)¡1g and PNS1 (LA) = pq[1 ¡ e¸pq(u¡1)], where
u = e¸pq(u¡1). It is easy to see that pUSc (RA) = p
NS
c (RA) =
pUSc (LA) = p
NS
c (LA) and
PUS1 (RA) = P
NS
1 (RA) = P
US
1 (LA) = P
NS
1 (LA) (25)
holds for all p and q.
To better appreciate the subgraph robustness under TA, we
here focus on the special case ® = 1, that is, nodes are
deleted linearly depending on their degrees. Note that ~P (k) =
e¡¸q(¸q)k=k! for k ¸ 0, pt = tp, and ~Gt(x) = p¡1e¸q(tx¡1).
For US under TA, we obtain pUSc (TA) = minf1; pc;tg, where
pc;t is determined by 1 = ¸qt2e¸q(t¡1) and p = e¸q(t¡1). We
have ~G0;t(x) = ~G1;t(x) = e¸pqt
2(x¡1). Hence, PUS1 (TA) =
pq[1¡e¸pqt2(u¡1)], where t is determined by p = e¸q(t¡1) and
u is determined by u = e¸pqt
2(u¡1). Note that P^ (k) = ~P (k),
s = t, and G^s(x) = p¡1e¸q(sx¡1). Accordingly, we have
pNSc (TA) = p
US
c (TA) and
PNS1 (TA) = P
US
1 (TA) (26)
for all p and q. It is not difcult to see that (26) also holds
for all ®.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION FOR SUBGRAPH ROBUSTNESS OF RR
NETWORKS
An RR network has a degenerated degree distribution
P (k) = ±k;k0 . Hence, G0(x) = xG1(x) = x
k0 . For US
under RA, we have pUSc (RA) = minf1; [q(k0 ¡ 1)]¡1g
and PUS1 (RA) = pq(1 ¡ uk0), where u = 1 ¡ pq +
pquk0¡1. Note that G^0(x) =
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (x¡ 1)
ik0
and
G^1(x) =
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (x¡ 1)
ik0¡1
. For NS under RA, we have
pNSc (RA) = min
½
1;
h
(k0 ¡ 1)q
k0¡2
k0
i¡1¾
and PNS1 (RA) =
pq
½
1¡
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¾
, where u = 1 ¡ p +
p
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¡1
.
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For US under LA, we have pUSc (LA) =
min
n
1; [q(k0 ¡ 1)]¡
k0
k0¡2
o
by noting ~G0(x) =
(1 ¡ q + qx)k0 and p = (1 ¡ q + qg)k0 .
PUS1 (LA) = pq
½
1¡
h
1 + qp
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¾
, where u
is given by u =
h
1 + qp
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¡1
. For NS under
LA, we have pNSc (LA) = min
n
1; q¡1(k0 ¡ 1)¡
k0
k0¡2
o
and
PNS1 (LA) = pq
½
1¡
h
1 + (pq)
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¾
, where u is
given by u =
h
1 + (pq)
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¡1
. We nd that for
all q the following relations between RA and LA hold:
pUSc (RA)
k0 = pUSc (LA)
k0¡2;
pNSc (RA)
k0 = pNSc (LA)
k0¡2:
(27)
For US under TA with ® = 1, we have
pUSc (TA) = min
n
1; [t2q(k0 ¡ 1)]¡
k0
k0¡2
o
, where t
satises 1 = t2(k0 ¡ 1)q[1 + q(t ¡ 1)]k0¡2; and
PUS1 (TA) = pq
½
1¡
h
1 + qt2p
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¾
,
where u satises u =
h
1 + qt2p
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¡1
and t is given by p = [1 + q(t ¡ 1)]k0 . For NS
under TA with ® = 1, we derive similarly that
pNSc (TA) = min
n
1; q¡1[s2(k0 ¡ 1)]¡
k0
k0¡2
o
, where s
satises 1 = s2(k0 ¡ 1)q
k0¡2
k0
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (s¡ 1)
ik0¡2
; and
PNS1 (TA) = pq
½
1¡
h
1 + s2(pq)
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¾
, where u
satises u =
h
1 + s2(pq)
k0¡2
k0 (u¡ 1)
ik0¡1
and s is given by
p =
h
1 + q
k0¡2
k0 (s¡ 1)
ik0
.
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